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Effects of sex preference and social pressure on fertility in 
changing Japanese families 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. This study explored how social pressure related to parental preference for 
the sex of their children affects fertility. Pre-war and post-war generations were 
compared using individual level data previously collected in Japan in 2002. In the 
pre-war generation, if the first child was a daughter, the total number of children 
tended to increase not only when the mother preferred a son, but also when the 
mother did not have a preference for either gender. This tendency was not observed 
for the post-war generation. Results suggest that social pressure related to giving 
birth to a son led to high fertility in the pre-war generation; however, fertility was 
not influenced by social pressure in the post-war generation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is widely acknowledged that parental preferences for the sex of their 
children exist (e.g., Ben-Porath and Welch, 1976, 1980; Behrman, 1988; Behrman et 
al., 1986; Leung, 1988). This topic has triggered a significant amount of research 
regarding the underlying reasons for these preferences and effects on family 
structure (e.g., Arnold and Liu, 1986; Arnold and Zhaoxiang, 1986; Dahl and 
Moretti, 2008; Das, 1987; Leung, 1991, 1994; Lundberg, 2005)1. The relationship 
between son preference and fertility is considered to be among the major issues. 
From the viewpoint of traditional economics, fertility is dependent on the female‟s 
decision (e.g., Becker, 1965; Cigno, 1991; Galor and Weil, 1996). For example, due to 
a substitution effect, an increase in female wages results in an increase in female 
labor supply and a reduction in demand for children (Becker, 1965). Within the 
framework of traditional theory, Ahn and Mira (2002) have posited that income 
effect prevails over substitution effect in the process of economic growth. If this is 
true, considering the stage of economic development is important when 
investigating fertility2. 
In the field of economics, researchers have focused not only on individual 
decision making but also on the attitudes of others when analyzing human behavior 
(Becker and Murphy, 2000). In pre-war Japan, family members were expected to 
subordinate their individual interests to those of the family as a whole (Hendry, 
1981). “Women were taught from an early age that their prime duty should be 
obedience: first to their father, then to their husband and husband‟s parents, and 
finally when widowed, to their son” (Hendry, 1981, p. 21). If a female did not obey 
the males in a family, she would be informally sanctioned by family members. This 
was an informal rule within a family and thus the social norm. More broadly stated, 
if members of a tightly knit group went against the social norm formed through long 
term interpersonal relationships, they suffered social ostracism3. The cost of social 
ostracism was significant in the family or community, which were both 
characterized by continuous and intensive personal interaction (Hayami, 2001). In 
this paper, this cost is regarded as the degree of social pressure. Social pressure 
                                                   
1 The one-child policy instituted by the Chinese government resulted in sex-selective 
abortions (Ebenstein, 2010). Especially in the countryside of China, sex-selective 
abortion was commonly observed (Zeng et al., 1993; Chu, 2001).  
2 According to Qian (2008), an increase in female income leads to mitigation of the 
distortion of the sex ratio at birth in China. 
3 The social norm remains, to a certain extent, in effect in Japan, although formal rule 
plays an important role (Yamamura, 2008a, 2008b).  
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depends to a great extent on the sociocultural and anthropological background of 
society. Hence, fertility is influenced not only by individual preference but also by 
social pressure, which varies according to the sociocultural condition4. 
Sociocultural conditions play a critical role in determining economic behavior, 
but the importance of this role has gradually decreased over time as an outcome of 
economic development (e.g., Greif, 1994, 2002; Hayami, 1998). Social pressure 
seems to lessen as a result of the diffusion of market-based transactions. If this is 
the case, economic development decreases the social pressure effect on fertility. 
Kureishi and Wakabayshi (2011) provided evidence that parents of the pre-war 
generation preferred a son. However, the son preference disappeared in the 
post-war generation, indicating that son preference had weakened in Japan. 
However, the dynamic process involving the social pressure effect on fertility has 
not been sufficiently investigated in existing research. It is widely acknowledged 
that Japan has experienced rapid economic growth during the post-World War II 
years. Income level, family structure, and inter-personal relations within 
communities in Japan have changed significantly in this period (Hendry, 1981). 
Therefore, it is appropriate to explore changes in income and social pressure as 
related to fertility in modern Japan. This study used individual level data to 
examine how not only a mother‟s preference but also social pressure influence 
fertility, after controlling for a mother‟s job status and education5. Furthermore, 
changes in these effects were explored by comparing pre-war and post-war 
generations.  
 
2. Change of Conditions in Japan  
 
Before the World War II period, each member of a family was expected to 
subordinate his or her individual interests to those of the family. Until the mid-19th 
century, property was regarded as belonging to the family as a whole (Hendry, 1981). 
The affairs of the family were managed ultimately by its head. „The principals were 
expected to agree with the choice of their elders, and it was not considered quite 
proper for a son, and particularly for a daughter, to express too strong an opinion on 
                                                   
4 Individual preference appears to be affected by family members‟ characteristics. 
Kawaguchi and Miyazaki (2009) found that men raised by full-time working mothers 
were less likely to have working wives.  
5 The social position and role of women have also changed remarkably in this period. In 
this regard, Spain is similar to Japan. For example, Gutierrez-Domenech (2008) has 
focused on the labor market when exploring marriage and fertility.  
 4 
the selection of the parents (Hendry, 1981, p. 17). Primogeniture became 
predominant during the 18–19th century and was institutionalized in the Meiji Civil 
Code (Article 970). The law of inheritance stipulated that all household property 
and authority should pass to the eldest son. The successor, the eldest son, was 
accorded deferential treatment next only to that of the head of the house. Under 
such conditions, parents were thought to prefer sons so as to provide heirs for the 
succeeding generations.  
In the post-war period, legislation gave all sons and daughters equal rights to 
inherit. Opportunity for higher education for women had increased and so had 
opportunities to take on prestigious and lucrative employment. As stated in the 
Constitution, women have been given the legal status of full and equal partners in 
marriage. Given these changes, „it seems that there is less emphasis on this 
successor‟s being the eldest son than there used to be, and other siblings usually 
receive a share of the inheritance in the form of education, financial help with a 
house or business, or a bridal trousseau (Hendry, 1981, p. 28–29).  
The greatest single factor to have influenced the Japanese way of life was 
defeat in World War II, with the introduction of democracy and other Western ideals 
into the legal and educational systems (Hendry, 1981). Apart from change of law, 
unprecedented economic growth started after World War II. Hence, economic 
conditions such as income level were different between the pre-war and post-war 
generations, which appeared to change the structure of the family and thus 
relationships between family members. These drastic changes are thought to have 
had an impact on determinants of fertility. 
 
3. Methods 
 
 Data  
This paper used individual level data including information such as age, years 
of education, marital status, and number of children6. In addition, age and spouses‟ 
years of education were included. These data were compiled from the National 
Survey: “Trails of Families in Post-War Japan” (TFPWJ hereafter) conducted in all 
parts of Japan in 2002. Five thousand adult females (born between 1920 and 1969, 
                                                   
6 Data for this secondary analysis is from the National Survey: “Trails of Families in 
Post-War Japan.” These data were designed by the Japan Society of Family Sociology. 
The research was subcontracted to Shin Joho Center Inc. and carried out in 2002. Data 
was provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center for Social 
Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo. 
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aged 32 to 81 years) were invited to participate in a survey with stratified two-stage 
random sampling. The survey collected data on 3475 adults, with a response rate of 
69.5%.  
 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
The construction of samples used in this research is shown in Table 1. The 
original sample contained 3475 observations. Among these observations, 3351 had 
experienced marriage. The sample size became 3189 when limited to those who had 
offspring. Hence, observations of infertile females were discarded. In addition, I 
omitted the observations without valid answers for respondents‟ and spouses‟ 
characteristics. Furthermore, the observations of those who were child-bearing age7 
were omitted, reducing the sample size to 2079. The sample was therefore restricted 
to females who had been fertile before their mid-40s, but could not bear a child in 
2002. This sample was used for estimation, and results are reported in Tables 3 and 
6.  
Comparisons of variables used for estimation between pre-war and post-war 
generations are shown in Table 2. The dependent variable was the total number of 
children. Total number of children for the post-war generation was smaller than for 
the pre-war generation, reflecting a birth rate decline. Independent variables are 
also shown in Table 2. To measure preference for a son I used the following question: 
“For your first child, which did you want to have, a boy or girl?” Respondents could 
choose from a numbered list, which included “boy,” “girl,” “either,” and “I didn‟t want 
a child.” According to Dahl and Moretti (2008), a first-born son is more likely to be 
living with a father compared to a first-born daughter, leading fathers to prefer sons. 
Thus, the likelihood of living with a mother is thought to be associated with the 
mother‟s preference.  
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
 
Figure 1(a) reveals that the number of married children living with their 
mothers in the post-war generation was lower than in the pre-war generation. 
Figure 1(b) indicates that the eldest son was more likely than other children in the 
family to live with his mother, but this tendency was less in the post-war generation. 
The decline of the likelihood that the eldest son lived with his mother was 
                                                   
7 Furthermore, women of child-bearing age were defined as those who were born after 
1955. That is, in 2002, they were younger than 47 years old. 
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consistent with the decline of preference for a son.  
The key variable of sex of the first child was coded 1 if the first child was male; 
otherwise, it was 0. To control for the probability of pregnancy, respondents‟ and 
spouses‟ ages at marriage as well as dummy variables for divorce and husband‟s 
death were included. Economic condition of the household was indicated by dummy 
variables for a husband‟s having experienced bankruptcy or job loss, first 
professional job occupation8, and husband‟s job9. Years of education for wives and 
husbands were incorporated to capture the human capital effect. Furthermore, 
cohort dummies were included to control for age effect10. 
  
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
For the purpose of examining the effect of changes in Japanese society on 
fertility, observations were divided into pre-war generation (husband born before 
1945) and post-war generation (husband born after 1946), 1522 and 560 
observations, respectively11. Divided observations were used for the regression 
estimation, and results are shown in Table 4. However, it was difficult to exactly 
divide the generation to capture the changes in perception and sociocultural 
condition because the generation born during the war possibly attended school in 
the post-war period12. Hence, alternative definitions regarding the generations were 
                                                   
8 In the questionnaire, professional occupation was defined as a job that requires highly 
specialized knowledge, such as doctor, lawyer, researcher, engineer/technical expert, 
reporter, writer, artist, teacher, nurse, pharmacist, child caretaker, and social worker. 
9 The husband‟s job was considered the professional occupation. Therefore, for the 
purpose of constructing husband‟s job dummies, I used the question “Which of the 
following describes your spouse‟s occupation when you married him?” Respondents 
chose from among a list, which included “regular employee of a large corporation (500 or 
more employees),” “regular employee of a small/medium corporation (less than 500 
employees),” “self-employed in agriculture,” “self-employed in areas other than 
agriculture,” “non-regular employee,” “He did not have a job.” Husband‟s job dummies 
were included when estimations were conducted but not reported in Tables 3, 4, or 5. 
10 Cohorts were divided into 5 groups based on those who were born in (1) 1920–1929, 
(2) 1930–1939, (3) 1940–1949, (4) 1950–1959, and (5) 1960–1969. 
11 The family head, ordinarily the husband, played an important role in household 
decision making in the pre-war period. The role of the husband changed, and his 
influence declined in the post-war period. It is important to consider such changes in 
environment when birth of children is considered. Hence, pre-war and post-war 
generations were divided based on the husband‟s birth year.   
12 Kureishi and Wakabayshi (2011) used the same data set as this study to compare the 
sex preference among different generations. They divided the sample into 1920–1939, 
1940–1954, and 1955–1969 cohort groups. 
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used when I conducted the estimation reported in Tables 5 and 613. As seen in Table 
2, respondents‟ average age at marriage in the post war-generation was higher than 
in the pre-war generation, whereas the age of husbands in the post-war generation 
was lower than in the pre-war generation. This suggests that female work 
opportunities increased in the post-war period, resulting in marriage postponement. 
The divorce rate was approximately 3% for both the pre-war and post-war 
generations, considered to be low. Death rate for husbands in the pre-war 
generation was 16.3%, distinctly higher than the 3.1% for the post-war generation. 
This finding might reflect that husbands born in the pre-war period were older than 
age 57 in 2002 when the survey was conducted; therefore, likelihood of death was 
higher than in the younger generation. Regarding bankruptcy or job loss, there was 
little difference between the pre-war generation (16.0%) and post-war generation 
(18.3%). I found it interesting that the percentage of professional occupations in the 
post-war generation was approximately one and a half times higher than in the 
pre-war generation, 16.4% and 11.2%, respectively. This suggests that post-war 
generation females were more likely than pre-war generation females to enter the 
labor market as specialists. Data on average years of education revealed that post- 
war generation females were more educated than pre-war generation females. Thus, 
the increase of specialists among females was due to the fact that females obtained 
highly specialized knowledge through education. Furthermore, rate of preference 
for a son (30.6%) was distinctly higher than preference for daughter (17.8%) in the 
pre-war generation, suggesting that son preference existed for the pre-war 
generation. The rate of preference for a son decreased to 23.9%, while that for a 
daughter increased to 22.8%. As a result, there was little difference between 
preference for a son or daughter in the post-war generation. This change in sex 
preference is in line with Kureishi and Wakabayashi (2011). 
 
3.2. Analyses 
I examined the relationship between the social pressure of preference for the 
birth of a son with fertility. I focused on the effect of the sex of the first child on total 
number of children. The estimated function takes the following form:  
 
(Total number of children-1) im = 0  + 1 (first male) im  + 2 (age at marriage)im + 
                                                   
13 In the definitions for Table 5, pre-war and post-war generations are defined as 
husbands born before 1935 and husbands born after 1936, respectively. In the 
definitions for Table 6, pre-war and post-war generations are defined as husbands born 
before 1925 and husbands born after 1926, respectively. 
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3(husband‟s age at marriage)im + 4 (divorce)im + 5 (husband‟s death)im + 
6(bankruptcy)im + 7 (professional)im + 8 (education)im  + 9 (husband‟s 
education)im  + em + uim 
where (Total number of children -1) im represents the dependent variable for 
individual i and spouse m. The sample comprised females who had at least one child. 
The number of children born after the first child was examined. Hence, the 
dependent variable takes 0 if the female did not bear a child after the first child. ‟s 
represents regression parameters, em captures spouse‟s job, represented by dummy 
variables, and uim represents the error term.  
This study aimed to examine how parents make a decision about number of 
children after the first child is born. Hence, observations of infertile females were 
discarded. This paper used count data, thus the dependent variable did not take 
negative values. Furthermore, the data used in this paper has two characteristics: 
„there is no natural a priori upper bound, and the outcome will be zero for at least 
some members of the population‟ (Wooldridge 2002, p. 645). In this case, as 
suggested by Wooldridge (2002), the Poisson model is more appropriate than the 
OLS model. Hence, I conducted the Poisson estimation. The key variable was First 
male, given a value of 1 if the first child was male, otherwise it was 0. The sample 
was divided into three groups including (1) mother‟s preference for a son, (2) 
mother‟s preference for a daughter, and (3) either. Regarding preference for a son, 
the expected sign for First male was negative mainly due to the mother‟s preference. 
That is, the mother has no incentive to have a baby if she preferred a son and the 
first child was male. As for preference for a daughter, the expected sign for First 
male was positive because the mother preferred a daughter. The mother has an 
incentive to have a baby if she preferred a daughter and the first child was male. 
With respect to the „either‟ group, the negative sign for First male implies that 
social pressure leads to fewer children by birth of a son since the mother did not 
prefer either a son or daughter. 
The results using observations of both the pre-war and post-war generations 
are reported in Table 3. The sample was divided into pre-war and post-war 
generations. Results are shown in Tables 4, 5, and 6. The Poisson estimations were 
then conducted to compare social pressure effects between pre-war and post-war 
generations. The preference of surrounding people such as family and relatives on 
fertility seemed to be more influential for the pre-war generation than for the 
post-war generation in Japan. To put it another way, social pressure was greater for 
the pre-war generation than for the post-war generation. Hence, First male is 
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expected to take the negative sign, and its absolute value is larger for the pre-war 
generation than for the post-war generation when mothers preferred a son. 
Furthermore, First male is anticipated to take the negative sign for the pre-war 
generation but is ambiguous for the post-war generation when mothers preferred 
either gender. Apart from First male, as explained earlier, various control variables 
were included to control for age at marriage, marital status, incidents after 
marriage, job, and education. 
 
4. Results 
 
Estimation results using all samples are reported in Table 3. Results of 
pre-war and post-war generations are exhibited in Tables 4, 5, and 6. 
I will discuss results of Table 3 and focus on results of First male, shown in the 
first row. As anticipated, as shown in column (1), signs for First male were negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level when respondents preferred a son. In 
column (2), First male was positive when respondents preferred a daughter, but 
statistically insignificant. This suggests that son preference has a critical effect on 
fertility, but daughter preference does not influence fertility. I interpret this as 
suggesting that the social pressure to bear a boy reinforced the incentive to bear a 
boy and reduced the incentive to bear a girl. It is interesting to observe that First 
male takes a significant negative sign for the „either‟ group as presented in column 
(3). The absolute value of First male is 0.20 in column (1). This implies that those 
who had a daughter as the first child have a 0.20 larger number of children than 
those who had a son as the first child when the sample is restricted to the „son 
preference‟ group. The absolute value of First male is 0.06 in column (3). This 
implies that those who had a daughter as the first child have a 0.06 larger number 
of children than those who had a son as the first child when the sample is restricted 
to the „either‟ group. It follows from this that social pressure significantly increases 
number of children when the first child is a daughter. 
 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
 
In Table 3, regarding age at marriage and husband‟s age at marriage, signs 
were negative in all estimations. Age at marriage is statistically significant in 
columns (1) and (2). It follows that the older women were, the fewer children they 
had. This is because number of children is limited by the child-bearing age of 
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women. On the other hand, husband‟s age at marriage is statistically significant 
only for the daughter preference group, as shown in column (2). Concerning the 
husband‟s age, the sexual desire and stamina needed to have a baby decrease as 
men become older even if there is no strict age limitation as there is for women. 
However, the incentive to have a child possibly neutralizes the negative effect of the 
husband‟s age. Therefore, results for husband‟s age at marriage reflect the degree of 
incentive to have a child. Husbands in the son preference and „either‟ groups are 
considered to have a greater incentive to have a child than those in the daughter 
preference group. This seems to neutralize the negative effect of husband‟s age at 
marriage.  
Divorce yielded significant negative signs only for the „daughter preference‟ 
group 14 . This suggests that divorce after birth of the first child reduces the 
likelihood that females bear children, resulting in a decline in fertility only when 
women prefer a daughter. However, this does not hold when women prefer a son or 
do not have a sex preference. I interpret this as meaning that a son preference and 
also social pressure to have a son leads to a higher incentive to bear a child, and 
thus children are born before unexpected incidents.  
It is very interesting that education produced positive signs in all estimations 
and is significant in column (1). Typically, years of education is positively correlated 
with rise in wages. The data revealed that a rise in female wages led to increased 
fertility, which is contrary to fundamental theory (Becker, 1965). This is, however, 
consistent with the argument of Ahn and Mira (2002): at sufficiently high female 
wage levels, a wage increase leads to an increase in fertility as the income effect 
supersedes the substitution effect. Signs for other variables were not stable, and 
their effect on fertility was ambiguous.  
 
 
4.2. Comparison between pre-war and post-war generations 
Tables 4, 5, and 6 are used to compare the determinants of fertility between 
pre-war and post-war generations. These tables show the results of pre-war and 
post-war generations in columns (1)–(3) and columns (4)–(6), respectively. Here, I 
concentrate focus on First male, regarded as the key variable. 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
                                                   
14 In Western countries, there are many unmarried mothers, so it is important to 
consider them (Dahl and Moretti, 2008). In TFPWJ data, however, unmarried mothers 
were very rare (only 3 cases were observed), so they were omitted.  
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First male produced significant negative signs for son preference and „either‟ 
groups in the pre-war generation, while it did not produce significance for any 
groups in the post-war generation. It appears that the social pressure for birth of a 
son existed in the pre-war generation but disappeared in the post-war generation. 
On the other hand, daughter preference did not influence fertility, implying that 
daughter preference did not provide sufficient incentive to bear a daughter, or the 
incentive to bear a daughter was neutralized by the social pressure to bear a boy. I 
interpret the findings in son preference and „either‟ groups as suggesting that 
interpersonal relationships within a family or between neighbors became weaker, 
resulting in decreased social pressure on decision making. Changes in interpersonal 
relationships and family structure have been reported by anthropologists (Hendry, 
1981) and can be explained by social pressure from the viewpoint of economics. In 
the pre-war generation group, the absolute value of First male was 0.19 and 0.09 for 
son-preference and „either‟ groups, respectively. This suggests that social pressure 
to have a son decreased the incentive to bear a child in the pre-war generation when 
the first child was a son, although the social pressure effect was smaller than the 
son-preference effect. 
 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
 
Regarding a robustness check of results presented in Table 4, I will discuss 
Tables 5 and 6. In Table 5, First male continued to yield a significant negative sign 
for son preference and „either‟ groups in the pre-war generation, but it did not yield 
a significant sign in the post-war generation. Table 6 shows similar results, 
although, as suggested in column (4), First male yielded a significant negative sign 
in the post-war generation. Considering the statistical analysis based on the 
individual data as a whole, the social pressure of bearing a son affected fertility in 
the pre-war generation, but hardly influenced it in the post-war generation. This is 
probably due to the change in interpersonal relationships as a result of economic 
development in Japan.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
As discussed in existing literature, the decision to have a child is made by 
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parents and is an individual issue. Anthropological works suggest, however, that 
close relationships with family and neighbors are associated with the various facets 
of individual decision making. Hence, fertility appears to be influenced by social 
pressure. On the other hand, social pressure within a tightly knit society based on 
long-term intensive personal interaction seems to lessen due to the diffusion of 
market based transaction and economic growth. If this is the case, the role played 
by social pressure changes over time in the long-term economic development process. 
Little is known, however, about the dynamic process of the effect of social pressure 
on fertility. This paper explored this process in the post-World War II period of 
Japan by using individual level data. The major finding was as follows: If the first 
child was a daughter, the number of children tended to increase not only when the 
mother preferred a son but also when the mother did not have a preference for 
either gender. This was observed in the pre-war generation but not in the post-war 
generation. Social pressure makes an impact on fertility. However, social pressure 
has decreased as a consequence of economic development. 
Compared to the existing literature, the main innovation of this paper involves 
understanding how not only individual sex preference but also social pressure are 
related to fertility in the process of economic development. This paper, however, 
does not define social pressure. That is, social pressure might come from a spouse, 
other members of the family, a relative, or neighbors. In order to clarify how social 
pressure is generated and how it affects fertility, a definition of social pressure is 
needed. The present research focused on the relationship between sex of the first 
child and total number of children. It would be of interest in future studies to 
examine the probability of parents having additional children, given the sex of the 
children already in their families.  
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(a) Percentages of married children living with their mothers  
 
 
(b) Percentage of married children living with their mothers by gender  
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(c) Percentage of married children living with divorced mothers by gender  
 
Fig.1 Probability of married children living with their mothers. 
Note. Panel (b) shows the composition of Panel (a). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 
Table 1.  Construction of Research Sample 
 Description Number in Sample 
 
Original Sample 
 
 3475 
Respondent has been married a 
 
3351 
Respondent has offspring 
 
3189 
Characteristics about self and spouse supplied by 
respondent. Furthermore, women of childbearing age, 
who were born after 1955, are omitted (variables 
appear in Table 2) . 
2079  b 
Note.  
a. The 3 samples for unmarried mothers were omitted.  
b. (I) Sample was used for estimations reported in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
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Table 2.  Comparison of Variables Between Pre-war and Post-war Generations a  
Variables Pre-war Post-war 
Total number of children b 
 
2.4 2.2 
First child was male (%) 
 
  52.0  50.9 
Average age at marriage 
 
  24.4  25.4 
Average age of husband at marriage   28.1  26.8 
 
Experienced divorce after birth of first 
child (%) 
   2.9   2.7 
Experienced husband‟s death after birth 
of first child (%) 
  16.3   3.1 
Husband experienced bankruptcy or job 
loss during marriage (%) 
  16.1  18.3 
First job was a professional occupationc 
(%) 
  11.2  16.4 
Average years of education 
 
  11.0  12.1 
Husband‟s average years of education 
 
  11.5  12.6 
Preference for a son (%) 
 
  30.6 23.9 
Preference for a daughter (%) 
 
  17.8 22.8 
Note.  
a. Pre-war and post-war generations are defined as husbands born before 1945 and 
husbands born after 1946, respectively. 
b. Total number of children was the dependent variable. 
c. In the questionnaire, professional occupation was defined as a job that requires highly 
specialized knowledge, for example, doctor, lawyer, researcher, engineer/technical 
expert, reporter, writer, artist, teacher, nurse, pharmacist, child caretaker, or social 
worker.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 19 
Table 3.  Comparison of Fertility Determinants Among Preferences for a Son, 
Daughter and Neutral (Poisson estimation) 
         Dependent variable: Number of children born after the first child. 
 
Variables    (1)   (2) (3) 
 Preference 
for a son 
Preferen
ce for a 
daughter 
Either 
First child was male (Yes = 1): dummy -0.20*** 
(-3.43) 
0.03 
(0.57) 
-0.06* 
(-1.70) 
Age at marriage 
 
 -0.02** 
(-2.18) 
 -0.02** 
(-2.33) 
 -0.01 
(-1.25) 
Age of husband at marriage -0.006 
(-0.70) 
-0.02* 
(-1.75) 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
Experienced divorce after birth of first 
child (Yes = 1): dummy 
0.08 
(0.52) 
-0.38** 
(-2.32) 
-0.16 
(-1.00) 
Experienced husband‟s death after 
birth of first child (Yes = 1): dummy 
0.07 
(1.09) 
-0.21 
(-1.59) 
-0.05 
(-0.81) 
Husband experienced bankruptcy or job 
loss during marriage (Yes = 1): dummy 
-0.01 
(-0.26) 
0.10 
(1.19) 
0.05 
(1.04) 
First job was a professional occupation 
(Yes = 1) : dummy 
0.10 
(1.52) 
0.18 
(1.64) 
0.0009 
(0.02) 
Years of education 
 
0.02* 
(1.73) 
0.003 
(0.14) 
0.002 
(0.17) 
Husband‟s years of education 
 
-0.01 
(-1.27) 
-0.007 
(-0.48) 
-0.001 
(-0.20) 
Constant 
 
1.21*** 
(4.39) 
1.43*** 
(4.05) 
0.88*** 
(4.14) 
Observations 634 432 1013 
Log pseudo-likelihood -835 -536 -1305 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * ,** 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. In all 
estimations, husband‟s job dummies, cohort dummies are included, but not reported.  
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Table 4.  Comparison of Fertility Determinants Among Preferences for a Son, Daughter and Neutral (Poisson estimation) 
         Dependent variable: Number of children born after the first child. 
 
Variables    (1)   (2) (3)     (4) (5) (6) 
     Pre-war generation 
 (Year of husband‟s birth < 1945) 
 Post-war generation 
(Year of husband‟s birth ≥ 1945) 
 Preference 
for a son 
Preference 
for a 
daughter 
Either  Preference 
for a son 
Preference 
for a 
daughter 
Either 
First child was male (Yes = 1): dummy -0.19*** 
(-2.81) 
0.03 
(0.42) 
-0.09** 
(-2.28) 
 -0.15 
(-1.52) 
-0.01 
(-0.13) 
0.02 
(0.37) 
Age at marriage 
 
 -0.03** 
(-2.35) 
 -0.02 
(-1.31) 
 -0.006 
(-0.47) 
  -0.02 
(-1.21) 
 -0.02 
(-1.01) 
 -0.04*** 
(-2.67) 
Age of husband at marriage -0.0008 
(-0.08) 
-0.03** 
(-2.03) 
-0.005 
(-0.50) 
 0.007 
(0.36) 
-0.01 
(-0.80) 
0.003 
(0.21) 
Experienced divorce after birth of first 
child (Yes = 1): dummy 
-0.08 
(-0.39) 
-0.42** 
(-2.11) 
-0.20 
(-0.95) 
 0.47*** 
(2.91) 
-0.59* 
(-1.65) 
0.03 
(0.20) 
Experienced husband‟s death after 
birth of first child (Yes = 1): dummy 
0.09 
(1.21) 
-0.20 
(-1.45) 
-0.03 
(-0.46) 
 0.04 
(0.27) 
-0.79 
(-1.53) 
-0.31 
(-1.34) 
Husband experienced bankruptcy or job 
loss during marriage (Yes = 1): dummy 
-0.03 
(-0.38) 
0.23** 
(2.12) 
0.07 
(1.09) 
 0.01 
(0.18) 
-0.19 
(-1.35) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
First job was a professional occupation 
(Yes = 1) : dummy 
0.13 
(1.49) 
0.21 
(1.36) 
-0.08 
(-1.22) 
 0.10 
(0.95) 
0.16 
(1.01) 
0.14* 
(1.67) 
Years of education 
 
0.02 
(1.21) 
0.01 
(0.67) 
-0.006 
(-0.41) 
 0.01 
(0.60) 
-0.003 
(-0.11) 
0.03 
(1.57) 
Husband‟s years of education 
 
0.02 
(1.21) 
-0.02 
(-0.98) 
0.004 
(0.41) 
 0.006 
(0.28) 
0.01 
(0.52) 
-0.01 
(-0.84) 
Constant 
 
1.34*** 
(4.15) 
1.50*** 
(3.22) 
0.82*** 
(3.41) 
 0.55 
(1.07) 
1.19** 
(2.24) 
1.01*** 
(2.60) 
Observations 481 288 753  153 145 262 
Log pseudo-likelihood -635 -359 -979  -196 -174 -323 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * ,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, husband‟s job dummies, cohort dummies are included, but not reported.  
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Table 5. Comparison of Fertility Determinants Among Preferences for a Son, Daughter and Neutral (Poisson estimation) 
         Dependent variable: Number of children born after the first child. 
 
Variables    (1)   (2) (3)     (4) (5) (6) 
     Pre-war generation 
 (Year of husband‟s birth < 1935) 
 Post-war generation 
(Year of husband‟s birth ≥ 1935) 
 Preference 
for a son 
Preference 
for a 
daughter 
Either  Preference 
for a son 
Preference 
for a 
daughter 
Either 
First child was male (Yes = 1): dummy -0.34*** 
(-3.87) 
0.20 
(1.49) 
-0.12** 
(-2.00) 
 -0.05 
(-0.80) 
-0.01 
(-0.25) 
-0.03 
(-0.77) 
Age at marriage 
 
 -0.02* 
(-1.74) 
 0.01 
(0.39) 
 -0.03** 
(-2.48) 
  -0.03** 
(-2.54) 
 -0.04*** 
(-2.82) 
 -0.02** 
(-2.33) 
Age of husband at marriage 0.007 
(0.53) 
-0.04* 
(-2.01) 
0.01 
(1.54) 
 -0.01 
(-1.30) 
-0.01 
(-0.78) 
-0.0006 
(-0.08) 
Experienced divorce after birth of first 
child (Yes = 1): dummy 
-0.37 
(-1.14) 
-0.75 
(-1.39) 
-0.48 
(-1.18) 
 0.18 
(1.12) 
-0.31* 
(-1.83) 
-0.02 
(-0.18) 
Experienced husband‟s death after 
birth of first child (Yes = 1): dummy 
0.08 
(0.96) 
-0.19 
(-0.89) 
-0.08 
(-1.17) 
 0.04 
(0.49) 
-0.22 
(-1.42) 
0.03 
(0.27) 
Husband experienced bankruptcy or job 
loss during marriage (Yes = 1): dummy 
0.06 
(0.60) 
0.27** 
(2.17) 
0.02 
(0.31) 
 -0.04 
(-0.63) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.04 
(0.94) 
First job was a professional occupation 
(Yes = 1) : dummy 
-0.07 
(-0.58) 
-0.12 
(-0.45) 
-0.09 
(-0.98) 
 0.15* 
(1.92) 
0.32*** 
(2.65) 
0.05 
(0.82) 
Years of education 
 
0.01 
(055) 
-0.007 
(-0.21) 
-0.01 
(-0.77) 
 0.03 
(1.59) 
0.008 
(0.34) 
0.01 
(1.00) 
Husband‟s years of education 
 
-0.01 
(-0.62) 
-0.04 
(-1.35) 
0.009 
(0.51) 
 -0.007 
(-0.50) 
0.004 
(0.24) 
-0.006 
(-0.59) 
Constant 
 
1.01** 
(2.42) 
1.76*** 
(2.77) 
0.99*** 
(2.76) 
 1.32*** 
(3.80) 
1.36*** 
(3.34) 
2.03*** 
(3.54) 
Observations 247 116 379  387 316 634 
Log pseudo-likelihood -335 -143 -499  -491 -387 -795 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * ,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, husband‟s job dummies, cohort dummies are included, but not reported.  
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Table 6.  Comparison of Fertility Determinants Among Preferences for a Son, Daughter and Neutral (Poisson estimation) 
         Dependent variable: Number of children born after the first child. 
Variables    (1)   (2) (3)     (4) (5) (6) 
     Pre-war generation 
 (Year of husband‟s birth < 1925) 
 Post-war generation 
(Year of husband‟s birth ≥1925) 
 Preference 
for a son 
Preference 
for a 
daughter 
Either  Preference 
for a son 
Preference 
for a 
daughter 
Either 
First child was male (Yes = 1): dummy -0.40*** 
(-3.52) 
0.55 
(1.42) 
-0.38*** 
(-3.00) 
 -0.16** 
(-2.20) 
0.01 
(0.26) 
-0.01 
(-0.30) 
Age at marriage 
 
 -0.01 
(-0.68) 
 -0.04 
(-0.96) 
 -0.04* 
(-1.91) 
  -0.03** 
(-2.63) 
 -0.03** 
(-2.50) 
 -0.007 
(-0.59) 
Age of husband at marriage -0.0005 
(-0.03) 
-0.26 
(-1.13) 
0.03** 
(2.36) 
 -0.01 
(-1.00) 
-0.01 
(-1.21) 
-0.01 
(-1.32) 
Experienced divorce after birth of first 
child (Yes = 1): dummy 
-0.29 
(-1.50) 
____ -0.04 
(-0.06) 
 0.09 
(0.61) 
-0.39** 
(-2.40) 
-0.15 
(-1.05) 
Experienced husband‟s death after 
birth of first child (Yes = 1): dummy 
0.15 
(1.25) 
0.27 
(0.35) 
-0.22* 
(-1.85) 
 0.01 
(0.18) 
-0.19 
(-1.58) 
-0.04 
(-0.60) 
Husband experienced bankruptcy or job 
loss during marriage (Yes = 1): dummy 
-0.02 
(-0.17) 
-10.1*** 
(-2.99) 
-0.10 
(-0.64) 
 -0.007 
(-0.10) 
0.11 
(1.28) 
0.07 
(1.32) 
First job was a professional occupation 
(Yes = 1) : dummy 
0.34 
(1.52) 
1.59 
(1.22) 
-0.23 
(-1.35) 
 0.09 
(1.26) 
0.22** 
(2.02) 
0.03 
(0.71) 
Years of education 
 
0.03 
(0.91) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.08** 
(2.07) 
 0.02 
(1.56) 
0.007 
(0.34) 
-0.005 
(-0.44) 
Husband‟s years of education 
 
-0.08** 
(-2.17) 
-0.47** 
(-1.96) 
-0.03 
(-1.18) 
 -0.006 
(-0.51) 
0.002 
(0.17) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
Constant 
 
1.47*** 
(2.66) 
12.2** 
(2.23) 
0.29 
(0.49) 
 1.37*** 
(4.48) 
1.26*** 
(3.67) 
0.91*** 
(4.42) 
Observations 82 24 112  552 408 901 
Log pseudo-likelihood -114 -22 -161  -716 -377 -1136 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * ,** and *** denote significance at the 10 %, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, husband‟s job dummies, cohort dummies are included, but not reported. In column (2), results 
for the dummy of experienced divorce after birth of the first child cannot be reported because its effect is completely captured by the 
cohort dummies. „Experienced divorce after birth of first child‟ is omitted because of perfect collinearity with cohort dummies. 
